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ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ON
BEHALF OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS:
THE IMPACT OF DOE V. CALUMET CITY*
PROLOGUE: THE CRIME AND AN OFFICER'S FAILURE TO ACT'
On the evening of December 19, 1987, Jane Doe2 and her two chil-
dren, Betty, twelve years old, and John, ten, attended a church service
and dinner.3 When they returned to their apartment 4 in Calumet City,
a suburb south of Chicago, Betty fell asleep in the living room watch-
ing television, while John went to sleep in his mother's room.5 At
about 4:30 a.m., Benjamin Valentine broke into the apartment, awak-
ening Betty.6 When she asked him who he was and what he wanted,
Valentine stated that he was the devil who was there to kill them. 7
Betty ran to her mother's room and woke Jane up.8 Valentine fol-
lowed and, standing at the foot of the bed, again announced that he
was the devil, sent by God to kill the family.9 He then climbed on top
of Jane and, while the children were in the room, began to fondle her
breasts and genital area. 10 After Valentine threatened to rape her,
Jane pleaded with him not to do anything in front of the children."
Strangely, Valentine complied with her request. He got off Jane and
directed Betty and John to leave the room.' 2 As he followed the chil-
* For their generous advice and detailed criticism, I am very grateful to Susan Joy Oda-
Whitmore, David Read, and Clifford Zimmerman.
1. In setting forth the facts, the author has primarily used three sources: Doe v. Calumet City,
641 N.E.2d 498 (I1. 1994); People v. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d 1338 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Benjamin
Valentine's criminal appeal); and Appellants' Brief, Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498 (Il.
1994) (No. 75347).
2. For privacy reasons, the plaintiffs are identified by pseudonyms.
3. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d at 1343.
4. Whereas the appellate court identified the apartment as occupying the second floor, the
appellants' brief noted that the unit was actually only ten to twelve feet above ground level.
Appellants' Brief at 7 n.4. The apartment's height is relevant since it pertains to the officers'
ability to gain access to the apartment.
5. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d at 1343.
6. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 501.
7. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d at 1243.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 501-02.
11. Id. at 502.
12. Appellants' Brief at 7.
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dren out, Jane fled and tried to escape through the front door.13 But
just as she opened the door, Valentine grabbed her by the hair.14 A
struggle then ensued, and they both tumbled down the exterior stairs
of the building.' 5 Valentine continued to attack Jane but was unsuc-
cessful in dragging her back to the apartment.' 6
Eventually, Valentine abandoned the assault and ran back up-
stairs.17 Jane followed him but could not enter the apartment by kick-
ing and pushing the door.' 8 Wearing only undergarments in the
predawn hours of a Chicago winter, Jane screamed to her neighbors
for help.19 Several responded and called 911.20
Shortly afterwards, an officer from the Burnham Police Department
arrived.21 At about 4:39, Officer James Horka of the Calumet City
Police Department also appeared, assumed a supervisory role, and
took control of the scene.22 Jane told Horka how Valentine had as-
saulted her and threatened her children. 23 She then pleaded with the
officer to "Go and get them!" and "Break the door in!"12 4 Several
neighbors intervened for Jane, begging Horka to help her and to res-
cue the children by breaking down the door.25 Horka, however, re-
plied that he would not break down the door because he did not want
to bear responsibility for the property damages. 26 Instead, the officers
asked whether Jane had a key to her apartment.2 7 When she replied
that she did not, Horka decided to wait for a key to be delivered by
the building's landlord, who lived in South Holland, a neighboring
municipality. 28
During the course of the incident, Horka established radio commu-
nications with Calumet City's police command.2 9 After a police dis-
13. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 502.
14. People v. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d 1338, 1344 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
15. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 502.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Appellants' Brief at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8 n.5.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Appellants' Brief at 8-9.
24. Id.
25. ld.
26. Id. In concluding that Horka was justified in not entering the apartment, the circuit court
of Cook County observed, "For all he knew the guy was sitting there playing pinochle with the
kids." Id. app. II.A.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Appellants' Brief at 10.
29. Id. at 11.
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patcher asked whether the incident was a rape, Horka answered, "I
don't know. I don't know what this is right now." °30 Despite his re-
sponse to the dispatcher, Horka assumed that he had been called to
resolve a domestic dispute, as he asked Jane, "Where is your hus-
band?" "Do you know the guy?" and "Why would you leave your
children in the apartment if there was a strange man there?"3' In con-
versation with the other officers, he characterized Jane as "an hysteri-
cal woman," a "girl . . . freaking out," who was "not coherent
anymore. "32
As other officers arrived, Horka ordered them to maintain positions
around the building. At 4:49, Horka's supervisor, Sgt. Ernest Targon-
ski, radioed the officer: "[I]f that's her apartment, you've got to get in
there somehow, so long as she states that that man is in there. We've
got to push the door in; push it in.,,33 In response to his supervisor's
order, Horka and the men in his command rang the doorbell, tapped
on windows, and shone a spotlight into the unit.34 Even though the
back door to the apartment remained unlocked, Horka and the other
officers never tried to gain entry into the unit.3 5
At approximately 5:00 a.m., Investigator Peter Miller of the
Calumet City Police Department arrived.3 6 Accompanied by three
policemen and, in violation of Horka's command, he entered the
apartment from the unlocked back door.37 They discovered Valentine
raping Jane's daughter, Betty.38 In an attempt to subdue Valentine,
one officer hit him with the butt of his pistol, and all four officers were
needed to bring him under control.39 During the twenty-one minutes
that passed before Miller entered the apartment, Valentine had re-
peatedly raped the twelve-year old and forced her to perform deviate
sexual acts.40 Her brother, John, had been threatened, terrorized, and
choked.41 As a result of the incident, Betty received both medical and
30. Rob Karwath, Tape Shows Cop Shunned Rescue Order, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1988, at C1.
31. Id. at C9-10.
32. Id. at C10. In addition to Horka's conduct and remarks, several Calumet City officers also
made patently sexist remarks: for example, "What would you expect from a woman?" and "Isn't
it just like a woman" to be in this situation. Id. at C13. None of the officers were subject to any
disciplinary action for their comments. Id.
33. Karwath, supra note 30, at C1.
34. Appellants' Brief at 10-11.
35. Id.
36. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. 1994).
37. Appellants' Brief at 12.
38. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 502-03.
39. Jerry Shnay, Man Guilty in Calumet City Rape: Chicagoan, 21, Faces a Prison Term of Up
to 60 Years, Cm. TiUB., Oct. 24, 1989, at C2.
40. Appellants' Brief at 12.
41. Id.
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psychological care.42 Her mother and brother received psychological
treatment. 43
INTRODUCTION
Exactly one year after the incident,44 Jane filed suit in Illinois state
court against the municipalities and officers, alleging among other
claims, gender discrimination pursuant to Section 1983.45 Her claims
were dismissed by the trial court, and the Illinois Appellate Court af-
firmed the dismissal.4 6 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, found
that on the civil rights claim, Jane stated a cause of action against Of-
ficer Horka and Calumet City.47 In Doe v. Calumet City,48 the Illinois
Supreme Court joined a handful of other appellate courts49 in finding
42. Following the crime, Jane and her daughter were taken to a hospital in Hammond, Indiana
for treatment. Rob Karwath, Cop Action in Rape Case Investigated, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1987, at
C8. While at the hospital, a Calumet City Fire Department paramedic criticized Horka for his
inaction. Id. Horka had the paramedic arrested on preliminary charges of obstruction of justice.
Rob Karwath, Calumet City Prosecutor Says Officer Allowed Rape to Occur, Cmi. TRIB., Mar. 16,
1988, at C9.
43. After a jury trial, Valentine was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault, at-
tempted criminal sexual assault and home invasion, and sentenced to concurrent terms of fifty-
five, twenty-five, and seven years, respectively. People v. Valentine, 582 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991); Jerry Shnay, 55- Year Prison Term in Calumet City Rape, Ci. TRIB., Nov. 29,
1989, at CO.
Horka was found guilty of five misconduct charges by Calumet City's Fire and Police Commis-
sion and subsequently fired. Rob Karwath, Police Officer in Rape Case Fired, Calumet City
Commission Finds Him Guilty of 5 Charges, Ci. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1988, at D1. Horka admitted
that he would have done things differently had he known all the facts at the time. Id. However,
when asked if he thought he did the right thing then, he responded: "Yes I do. I didn't get
anybody killed." Id. Horka's discharge was overturned by a Cook County Circuit Judge who
concluded that a police officer's split second decisions should not be governed by hindsight.
Charles Mount & Laurie Goering, Judge Overturns Calumet City Cop Firing, Cm. TRIB., Apr.
12, 1989, at C1. Horka, in his defense, asserted, "I never back down from anybody, but with two
kids it's different." Id. He also reiterated that if put in the same situation again, he would make
the same decision. Laurie Goering, Calumet City Officer Back on the Job, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 20,
1989, at C1. As the case went back on remand, Horka remained a patrol officer with the depart-
ment. Telephone Interview with Andrew Trader, Assistant Chief of the Calumet City Police
Department, Calumet City, Il. (Jan. 4, 1995),
44. Charles Mount, 2 Suburbs, 4 Police Officers Sued Over Response to Girl's Rape, Cm.
TRIB., Dec. 20, 1988, at D3.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 191-92 (enumerating Jane's claims). Three of the de-
fendant officers, including Horka, were members of the Calumet City police department. Doe v.
Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 501 (I1. 1994). A fourth officer was from the Village of Burnham.
Id.
46. See infra notes 191-219 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of lower courts).
47. See infra notes 220-51 and accompanying text (discussing the supreme court's opinion).
48. 641 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 1994).
49. At the appellate level, the other pro-plaintiff decisions include Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) and Watson v. City of Kan. City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690 (10th
Cir. 1988). For a discussion of Watson and Balistreri, see infra notes 127-49 and 171-89 and
accompanying text, respectively.
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that the defendant police department violated the Equal Protection
Clause by failing to respond to a perceived domestic assault.50
The supreme court's ruling sparked strong reactions from women's
advocates, municipalities, and police departments. One advocate pre-
dicted the decision heralded "a new area of the law" that promised to
"respect... women's and children's lives. It isn't a 'see no evil, hear
no evil' world anymore."' 51 Attorneys for municipalities, on the other
hand, argued that the ruling would expand liability for police depart-
ments and towns because officers would be subject to more litiga-
tion.52 According to a deputy corporation counsel for the City of
Chicago, Doe created a species of liability unprecedented in Illinois,
one that is rare, if not unheard of, nationwide.5 3 After the decision,
the old police adage - you can't get fired for doing nothing -
needed to be reconsidered. 54 Significantly, many officers viewed Doe
not as an unjust indictment but as a salutary reminder: because Doe's
egregious circumstances could be ascribed to the rogue actions of an
individual officer, the decision merely reaffirmed the need for depart-
ments to train their officers properly.5 5 Norval Morris agreed with
this assessment. He believed that the decision would lead to more
litigation but would result in liability only in extreme cases.56
As this Note will demonstrate, however, Doe cannot be marginal-
ized by confining its holding to analogous fact patterns that are
equally flagrant but rarely encountered. In order to appreciate its im-
pact, Doe must be situated in the context of civil rights law to show
where it builds upon and extends constitutional precedent. To do this,
the background section of the Note provides an overview of equal
protection methodology and gender classifications. 57 The Note then
reviews how the Equal Protection Clause has been applied to battered
50. The overriding irony in Doe is that Officer Horka chose not to respond to a violent crime
against Jane and her children based upon his mistaken assumption that Jane was the victim of a
domestic assault.
51. Jean Latz Griffin & Julie Irwin, Police Say Ruling is a Reminder, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1994,
§ 2, at 7.
52. Doug Dusik & Colleen Diskin, Suit's Reinstatement Draws Mixed Response, DAILY
SoumrHowN, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al; Dave Lenckus, Liability for Police Inaction: Police Can Be
Sued for Not Preventing Criminal Harm, Bus. INs., Aug. 15, 1994, at 2.
53. Lenckus, supra note 52, at 2.
54. Griffin & Irwin, supra note 51, at 7.
55. Dusik & Diskin, supra note 52, at A16; Griffin & Irwin, supra note 51, at 7.
56. Griffin & Irwin, supra note 51, at 7 ("Juries and judges are very reluctant to hold police
responsible for decisions that have to be made under pressure in a split second .... It has to be
willful and wanton misconduct. Standing by and watching someone be beaten up, that would be
clear.").
57. See infra Part L.A (discussing equal protection standards of review in the context of gen-
der-based discrimination).
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women under Section 1983.58 After detailing the degree and level of
judicial scrutiny applied to domestic violence cases, the Note then
considers the importance of archaic and overbroad stereotypes as
proof of discriminatory intent.59 A discussion of Doe follows, review-
ing the pro-defendant opinions of the two lower courts and the
supreme court's reversal.60 Next, the Note analyzes the Doe opinions,
showing how Jane's narrative of sexualized violence was vulnerable to
attack as unbelievable. 61 Those who heard Jane's account, the police
and the lower courts, misinterpreted and rewrote its message to con-
form to their own stereotypical assumptions about how the story's
plot should develop and how much credence should be granted to
someone in Jane's position. From their perspective, Jane was an ex-
cited, unstable woman who claimed to have been assaulted but was
probably roughed up by a husband or boyfriend. The Note critiques
this perspective by examining gender stereotypes and the problem of
belief as they apply to sexual assault and to claims of hysteria.62 The
Note then discusses stereotypes and the problem of police inaction in
the context of domestic violence.63 The Note concludes by underscor-
ing the impact of Doe v. Calumet City and its relevance for domestic
violence victims in civil rights actions. The Note will demonstrate that
Doe's significance is more than a reminder to police departments to
serve and protect; instead, it redefines how an Equal Protection viola-
tion accrues and, in so doing, lowers the burden for domestic violence
plaintiffs. 64
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, ' 65
"which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See infra Part I.B (discussing the application of equal protection
methodology to domestic violence cases).
59. See infra Part .C (discussing the use of stereotypes to demonstrate discriminatory
purpose).
60. See infra Part II (discussing the Illinois courts' treatment of Doe's Equal Protection
claims).
61. See infra notes 257-59' and accompanying text (discussing how the plaintiff's story of sex-
ual assault was subject to misinterpretation).
62. See infra notes 265-99 and accompanying text (discussing sexual assault, hysteria and the
problem of belief).
63. See infra notes 300-20 and accompanying text (discussing police lack of response to do-
mestic violence crimes).
64. See infra notes 321-32 and accompanying text (discussing how the supreme court's inferen-
tial analysis eases the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden).
65. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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should be treated alike."'66 Though the Equal Protection Clause does
not deny the government's ability to classify individuals in the crea-
tion and administration of laws, it does ensure that those classifica-
tions are not grounded upon "impermissible criteria or arbitrarily
used to burden a group of individuals. ' 67 One distinction based on
impermissible criteria is a police department's classification differenti-
ating domestic from non-domestic assaults, thereby according prefer-
ential treatment to the victims of non-domestic assaults.68 This
section will examine the Supreme Court's evolving doctrine on gender
discrimination and how lower courts have applied the doctrine to do-
mestic violence cases.
A. Equal Protection Methodology and Classifications
Based on Gender
The Supreme Court has employed three "standards of review" in its
examination of governmental classifications under equal protection
challenges: the rational relationship standard, the strict scrutiny test,
and the intermediate scrutiny test.69 The Court has applied all three
levels of scrutiny in the history of gender discrimination case law, be-
ginning with the rational basis standard, pausing briefly to apply the
strict scrutiny test, and finally settling upon the intermediate
standard. 70
1. The Rational Relationship Standard
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 had little effect
upon classifications based on gender.71 For the next one hundred
years, the Supreme Court upheld legislation that presumed that men
and women should occupy the roles traditionally allotted to them by
American society.72 Hence, the Court treated sex-based classifica-
tions with the deferential posture reserved for economic and social
66. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyer v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
67. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITrnONAL LAW § 14.2, at 570 (4th ed.
1991).
68. See Watson v. City of Kan. City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding an Equal
Protection violation where a city and police department followed a policy of affording less pro-
tection to domestic violence victims than to victims of non-domestic attacks).
69. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 14.3.
70. See infra notes 71-106 and accompanying text (discussing standards of review as applied to
gender discrimination cases).
71. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 14.20, at 733.
72. Id.; LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1559 (2d ed.
1988). The patriarchal attitude of the early cases is captured by Justice Bradley's concurrence in
Bradwell v. Illinois:
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welfare legislation, 73 asking merely whether the classification was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest.74 In Goesaert v. Cleary,75
for example, the Court upheld a Michigan law that prohibited a
woman from obtaining a license for tending bar unless she was the
wife or daughter of the male tavern owner. 76 "Since bartending by
women may," according to Justice Frankfurter, "give rise to moral and
social problems," it was not irrational for the Michigan legislature to
believe that these problems would be minimized by the supervision of
the barmaid's husband or father.77
2. A Heightened Standard of Review: Gender as a Suspect and
Quasi-Suspect Class
The Court reexamined its traditional deferential attitude to gender-
based classifications in Reed v. Reed,78 decided a century after the rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reed, the Court struck
down a statute that preferred men over women in the administration
of an intestate estate.79 Reed marked the first time the Court em-
ployed the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a gender classifica-
tion.80 Although the Court purported to apply the mere rationality
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organi-
zation, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and func-
tions of womanhood ....
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties,
complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are excep-
tions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
73. The Court articulated the deferential standard reserved for economic and social welfare
legislation in Railway Express Agency v. New York: Where the classification "has relation to the
purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the
Equal Protection Clause affords protection," the Court will uphold the regulation against an
Equal Protection challenge. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
74. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("The equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in
the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is
purely arbitrary.").
75. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
76. Id. at 466-67.
77. Id. at 466. See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding a state statute constitu-
tional that accorded women an absolute exemption from jury service unless they expressly
waived the privilege). That court also pronounced that the relevant inquiry is whether the ex-
emption is based on a reasonable classification. Id. at 59-65.
78. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
79. Id. at 77.
80. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 14.22, at 739.
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standard, 81 the decision may be understood by assuming that "some
special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analy-
sis." 82 By holding that the gender classification was "arbitrary," the
Reed court must have imported some special suspicion of sex-related
means from the equal protection framework:83 "A classification 'must
be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground of dif-
ference having a fair and substantial relation to that object of the leg-
islation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.' "84 To grant a mandatory preference to one sex in order to
reduce the workload in probate courts "is to make the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. '85
The Court's tacit abandonment of minimal scrutiny in Reed was
made explicit two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson.86 In Fron-
tiero, eight justices agreed that the differential treatment accorded ser-
vicewomen's dependency benefits was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 87 Justice Brennan, writing for a plu-
rality, noted that "our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rational-
ized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect,
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."'88 As a result of these
patriarchal attitudes, "our statute books gradually became laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes."'89 Brennan drew a
parallel between the nineteenth century position of women in our so-
ciety and the position of blacks under the pre-Civil War codes, 90 con-
81. Tribe, supra note 72, § 16-26, at 1561. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the rational relationship standard applied in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)).
82. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1972).
83. Id.
84. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920)).
85. Id.
86. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional classifications enacted for administrative
convenience that made spouses of male members of the uniformed services dependents for pur-
poses of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits, but did not
include spouses of female members as dependents unless they were dependent for over one-half
of their support).
87. Id. at 690-91.
88. Id. at 684.
89. Id. at 685.
90. "[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Id. Like the
slaves, women were prohibited from holding office, serving on juries, suing in the their own
names, and married women could not hold or convey property or serve as legal guardians of
their children. Id. And even though blacks were provided the right to vote in 1870, women were
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cluding that classifications based on sex, like those based on race, are
inherently suspect and therefore deserving of close judicial scrutiny.91
Brennan's view in Frontiero of gender as a suspect class never com-
manded the majority of justices voting in a single case.92 Instead, in
the five years following Reed, the Court considered a number of gen-
der-based classifications without coming to an agreement concerning
the appropriate standard of review. 93 In 1976, the Court compro-
mised, settling upon an intermediate level of scrutiny in Craig v. Bo-
ren.94 In Craig, the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited the sale
of 3.2 percent beer to males under twenty-one and to females under
eighteen. 95 Justice Brennan noted for the majority that previous cases
established that gender-based classifications must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives if they were to withstand constitu-
tional challenge. 96 After Craig, discrimination against women is
neither suspect nor merely subject to the less exacting, deferential ra-
denied that right until the adoption of the nineteenth amendment in 1920. Id. See also Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (citation omitted) ("[S]ince sex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to
violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility ......."). On the analogy between racial and gender discrimination, see
R. WASSERSTROM, PILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 17 (1980); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (1977) (explain-
ing that classifications based on these immutable characteristics grow out of solicitude for the
victims of stigma and further lead to a society based on stereotypes).
91. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
92. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 14.22, at 740.
93. Id. On the case law between Reed in 1971 and Craig in 1976, see generally Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (applying rational basis scrutiny, unwed father entitled to hearing
before children were adopted by another person); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (applying
the "fair and substantial relation" standard of Reed, and upholding a statute that granted widows
a property tax exemption but denied any analogous benefit for widowers); Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding a legislative classification completely rational where women
naval officers were given more time than men to gain mandatory promotion); Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that a state system that excluded women from jury service
violated the Sixth Amendment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding a stat-
ute unconstitutional that conferred benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and
father to widows and minor children, but that conferred benefits based on the earnings of a
deceased wife and mother only to minor children); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (hold-
ing a statute invalid that required parents to provide support payments for sons until age twenty-
one but for daughters only until age eighteen).
For critical surveys of the relevant case law through the early 1970s, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Gunther, supra
note 82; John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 617 (1974).
94. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
95. Id. at 210.
96. Id at 197-98.
1995] ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 133
tional basis standard; instead, it is "quasi-suspect," 97 judged by a more
flexible but less predictable intermediate level of scrutiny.98
Post-Craig decisions applied an elevated intermediate scrutiny to
benign gender classifications, 99 marital and family rights,100 statutory
rape, 101 military service, 102 and educational programs.' 0 3 The Equal
Protection Clause 104 has also been applied on behalf of battered
97. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976).
98. The adoption of the intermediate standard was opposed by Justice Stevens in his concur-
rence (the Equal Protection clause "does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in
some cases and a different standard in other cases") and Justice Rehnquist in dissent (the
Court's enunciation of the intermediate standard "apparently comes out of thin air"). Craig, 429
U.S. at 211-12, 220 (Stevens, J. concurring and Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding classification that granted
higher payments to retired female workers than to similarly situated males).
100. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding statute which allowed
mothers, but only certain "putative fathers," to receive notice of and veto the adoption of an
illegitimate child); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding invalid a statute which
gave the husband, the "head and master" of the family, the unilateral right to dispose of prop-
erty jointly owned with his wife without his spouse's consent); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) (invalidating a law that required the consent of unwed mothers, but not unwed fa-
thers, before the adoption of the child); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding unconstitutional
a law that required only men to make alimony payments); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979) (upholding a statute which allowed the mother, but not the father, of an illegitimate child
to sue for the child's wrongful death).
101. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape
law that made men, but not women, criminally liable).
102. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a statute that required men,
but not women, to register for the draft).
103. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down law
denying admission to men at a state nursing school because the women-only policy tended to
"perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job").
104. In addition to bringing claims grounded in equal protection, battered women have also
sought recovery in suits based on the denial of due process and on the failure to adequately train
the police. The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), has, however, severely curtailed women's ability to bring a successful
substantive or procedural Due Process suit. In Deshaney, a child was repeatedly abused by his
father until he was permanently disabled, even though county social workers, who several times
observed signs of physical abuse, did nothing to protect the boy. Id. at 192-93, 201. The Court
ruled that the county officials did not deny the child due process: "[T]he Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary
to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual." Id. at 196. On the claims of battered women based upon due process and the im-
pact of DeShaney, see Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The
Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1078 (1990); Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and
Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirmative Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government
Liability Under Section 1983,24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1990); David Winthrop Hanson, Battered
Women: Society's Obligation to the Abused, 27 AKRON L. REV. 19 (1993); James T.R. Jones,
Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police After
DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983
Damage Actions]; Caitlin E. Borgman, Note, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims:
Can Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280 (1990).
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women under Section 1983105 but with varying results.'0 6 One reason
battered women have not enjoyed consistent success in civil rights ac-
One week after DeShaney came down, the Supreme Court decided City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989), in which the Court recognized the "failure to train" theory. After Canton,
battered spouses could recover in a failure to train suit, but only after they satisfied three prongs:
(1) the training must be inadequate; (2) the municipal policymakers must be deliberately indif-
ferent to the need for adequate training; and (3) the failure to train must be the cause of the
constitutional deprivation. Id. at 388-93. On Canton and its implications, see Mark R. Brown,
Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
625, 645-57; Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liabil-
ity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 511,
539-46 (1989); Elizabeth Dale, City of Canton, Ohio and Failure To Train Cases: Avoiding the
Snares, 3 POICE MISCONDUCr & Civ. RTs. L. REP. 73 (1991); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell
Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 539, 605-11 (1989); Jones, supra, at 339-41, 355-56.
The Court in DeShaney, while circumscribing the reach of the due process theory, affirmed in
a footnote the application of the Equal Protection Clause to a state's selective denial of its pro-
tective services. 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989). Given the impact of DeShaney, commentators
have generally agreed that plaintiffs now have a better chance at recovery under an Equal Pro-
tection claim rather than one based on due process. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Dam-
age Actions, supra note 104, at 308, 356; Helen Rubenstein Holden, Comment, Does the Legal
System Batter Women? Vindicating Battered Women's Constitutional Rights to Adequate Police
Protection, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705, 718 (1989).
On alternative theories of recovery for battered women, see Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence: Making State Institutions More Responsive, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1551, 1571-73 (1993) (suggesting use of state tort claims); Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Reme-
dies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 53-97 (1992) (setting forth
proposed federal legislation: Title III of the Violence Against Women Act); James T.R. Jones,
Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J.
1 (1991) (recommending state law negligence suits, state tort suits, and state constitutional law
actions); Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable
Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1393, 1422-25 (1990) (suggesting that state tort law claims are feasible tools for
recovery).
105. Section 1983 provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Defendants under Section 1983 include both natural persons and local governments. Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658. 690 (1978). The elements for stating a cause of
action vary depending on the identity of the defendant. To establish personal liability, the plain-
tiff must allege that a person, acting under color of state law, has deprived him of a federal right.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). To establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must
allege that the defendant's "official policy [was] responsible for a deprivation of rights protected
by the Constitution." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
On the application of Section 1983 to the battered woman context, see Gary M. Bishop, Note,
Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30
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tions is the courts' reluctance to find gender discrimination in these
cases and then to apply an elevated standard of scrutiny.
B. Equal Protection Methodology and Domestic Violence
The first part of this section traced the Supreme Court's use of the
three-tier Equal Protection standards of review to gender classifica-
tions: from minimal scrutiny (Goesaert)10 7 to strict scrutiny (Fron-
tiero)10 8 to an intermediate standard (Craig).10 9 Notably, the
evolution of domestic violence case law has proceeded in the opposite
direction: from the elevated standard established by Thurman v. City
of Torrington"° in 1984 to the rational basis rule adopted by post-
Thurman courts.
B.C. L. REV. 1357 (1989); Margo Cooper, Note, Duties and Enforcement Mechanisms for the
Rights of Battered Women, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 937 (1982).
106. Commentators have noted several ironies in the sex discrimination case law. One incon-
gruity is that many of the cases were brought by male plaintiffs. TRIBE, supra note 72, § 16-26, at
1564. A more telling irony is that many of the decisions concern legal questions of less than
momentous significance.
For example, in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), the Court invalidated a provision of
the Social Security Act that gave benefits to the widow of a deceased worker but only to a
widower if he proved actual dependency. Addressing the legal issue in Goldfarb, Mary E.
Becker underscored the "trivial" impact of the case. Given the systematic discrimination against
women that pervades our society,
Goldfarb does nothing significant about the problems women face. Relative to the
changes necessary to achieve equality between the sexes, it is trivial.
From the perspective of women's equality, the case is trivial in another sense: it
involves a challenge to the award of benefits to a man. Furthermore, the woman who
had made the relevant contributions to the system was dead. One would expect the
case to have had only the most limited effect on the status of women in the real world
during their lives and marriages .... The change may have been worth making, de-
pending on the costs associated with it, but one would not imagine that it did much
good ....
[I]t surely would be relevant to note that the Court developed its constitutional stan-
dard for sex equality in trivial cases. It seems likely that development in such a context
might affect the effectiveness of a substantive standard.
Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seid-
man, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 274-76 (1989).
In contrast to Becker's line of "trivial" case law, the Fourteenth Amendment decisions con-
cerning battered women would appear to take on a more critical and influential power. The
marginalization of these cases may reveal something lacking, as Becker puts it, in the effective-
ness of a substantive standard.
107. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the rational
relationship standard in Goesaert).
108. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussing how classifications based on sex
are inherently suspect).
109. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications).
110. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
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1. Thurman v. City of Torrington: Heightened Scrutiny
A heightened standard of scrutiny was applied in the first important
domestic violence decision that raised the Equal Protection argu-
ment,"' Thurman v. City of Torrington.112 In 1983, Tracey Thurman
notified the defendant municipality that her estranged husband,
Charles, had threatened both her and her children. 113 Tracey's at-
tempts to file complaints against Charles were either ignored or re-
jected by police officers and the municipality. 114 After a number of
instances in which the police failed to arrest Charles, he again
threatened Tracey, and she again phoned the police."15 When Tracey
tried to reason with him on this occasion, Charles stabbed her repeat-
edly in the chest, neck, and throat, leaving her partially paralyzed."16
The district court in Thurman found that the Equal Protection
Clause required that city officials and police officers have an affirma-
tive duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal safety
of individuals in the community."17 This duty extended to the victims
of domestic violence, provided that officials have notice of the possi-
bility of such attacks.1 8 Tracey Thurman alleged that the police
department employed a de facto gender-based classification that af-
forded lesser protection when the victim was a battered woman or
battered child. 119 For the classification to survive constitutional scru-
tiny, the city had to articulate an important governmental interest,
which it failed to do.120 The court rejected any suggestion that the
police department's inaction could be justified as a means of promot-
ing domestic harmony.' 2' Any such justification was belied by Tra-
cey's own actions: she evinced no desire to work out her problems
privately, but rather pleaded with the police for protection and sought
a restraining order against Charles. 122 After the district court ruled
111. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions, supra note 104, at 274.
112. On cases raising the Equal Protection problem before Thurman, see Carolyne R.
Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in Police Reluctance to Respond to
Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 667, 676-77 (1986).
113. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1525.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1527.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1527-28.
121. Id. at 1529.
122. Id.
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for Tracey on the civil rights claim, the jury awarded her $2.3 million
for her injuries.12 3
2. Post-Thurman Case Law: Stricter Standards for Plaintiffs
Thurman was clearly a landmark decision,124 and several district
courts adopted its analysis.' 25 Other district courts and courts of ap-
peals, however, have been more restrictive in their use of the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 6
Three years after Thurman, the Tenth Circuit in Watson v. City of
Kansas City, Kansas,2 7 delineated the terms in which most courts
have applied the Fourteenth Amendment to domestic violence
claims. 128 Watson involved a long history of domestic violence in
which the husband, a police officer, repeatedly physically abused his
wife, Nancy.' 29 The police, in response to Nancy's claim that her hus-
band had shaken a knife at her, replied: "[I]f you ever call the police
123. Officers Must Pay $2.3 Million to Wife Maimed by Husband, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,1985,
at B6. After the case was appealed, Tracey settled out of court for $1.9 million. Dirk Johnson,
Abused Women Get Leverage in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 1986, § 4, at 8. Three years to
the date after the stabbing attack. Connecticut passed into law one of the strongest family vio-
lence bills in the nation. Id.
124. Charlotte Libov, Domestic Violence Focus of Training, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1985, § 23,
at 1.
125. See Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381,394 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied
sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part sub
nom. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff
established an Equal Protection claim by asserting that the police department classified domestic
assaults differently from non-domestic attacks and chose not to intervene in domestic assaults):
Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that an abused
spouse's complaint stated an Equal Protection violation by claiming that the police chose not to
enforce their policy of intervening in domestic violence cases); Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F.
Supp. 244 (N.D. Ii. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff sufficiently alleged that a policy by defendant
city discouraged vigorous prosecution of violent crimes against women).
For a thorough survey of the relevant case law, see Harper, supra note 104, at 1402-25; Chris-
topher J. Klein, Note, Will the § 1983 Equal Protection Claim Solve the Equal Protection Prob-
lem Faced by Victims of Domestic Violence? A Review of Balistreri, Watson, Hynson, and
McKee, 29 J. FAM. L. 635 (1990-1991).
126. Harper, supra note 104, at 1404. See also Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1118 (3rd
Cir. 1990) ("We believe that Thurman... a lone district court case from another jurisdiction,
cannot sufficiently have established and limned the equal protection rights of a domestic vio-
lence victim ... to enable reasonable officials to 'anticipate [that] their conduct [might] give rise
to liability for damages.' ").
127. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
128. On the necessity of distinguishing between the two types of discrimination, see Lauren L.
McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police Will
Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 945-47 (1991).
129. 857 F.2d at 692. See Sharman Stein, Cops' Spouses Face Abuse Problem Too, Cm. TarB.,
Nov. 15, 1994, § 1, at 1 (discussing the problem of domestic violence in Chicago where police are
the abusers).
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again, I will see to it that you are arrested and you'll never see those
two kids again.' 130 After a tumultuous two years, the husband broke
into Nancy's residence, raped and stabbed his wife, and committed
suicide.' 3 ' One officer responding to the scene told the brutalized vic-
tim that she was at fault for marrying her husband.1 32
According to the Watson court, plaintiffs may allege two types of
discrimination in their Equal Protection suit: 1) that municipal policy
or custom discriminates against domestic violence victims, or 2) that
the failure of police departments to respond adequately to domestic
violence constitutes sex discrimination. 133 The court concluded that
the plaintiff, by marshalling statistics and other evidence of police de-
partment policy, had demonstrated that the defendants provided less
protection to domestic assault victims than to nondomestic assault vic-
tims. 134 However, Nancy Watson had not shown any discriminatory
purpose behind the classification, and therefore the gender discrimi-
nation claim failed. 135
The first type of discrimination is not predicated on gender; rather,
the classification is between domestic and nondomestic crimes. If the
plaintiff alleges that the municipality or police department has failed
130. Watson, 857 F.2d at 692.
131. Id. at 693.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 696-97.
134. Id. at 695-96. The plaintiff in Watson amassed data to show that nondomestic assaults
resulted in an arrest rate of 31 percent, whereas domestic assaults yielded an arrest rate of only
16 percent. Id. The court did not decide whether statistical evidence alone would prove the
existence of policy or custom. Id. Instead, the plaintiff presented other evidence regarding po-
lice officer training: the training emphasized first defusing the domestic violence situation and
using arrest as a last resort. Id. at 696. Taken together - the statistics and the evidence of
training - the court reversed the summary judgment awarded to the defendants. Id.
The successful use of statistical evidence in Watson may be contrasted with its unsuccessful use
in McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff in McKee com-
piled comparative data over a five-year period to show that the percentage of nondomestic as-
saults leading to arrests was 36 percent, whereas the percentage for domestic assaults was 21
percent. Id. at 411. The Fifth Circuit noted several problems with the figures. First, a mathe-
matical error exaggerated the discrepancy between the two types of assaults. Id. at 412, 415. In
addition, in two of the five years surveyed, the domestic assault arrest rate was higher than the
nondomestic assault arrest rate. Id. at 415. The court also stated that the statistics did not ac-
count for the many factors that might influence the probability of the police making an arrest:
whether the police witnessed the crime, whether a weapon was used, whether the victim was
injured, and whether the victim refused to press charges. Id. Finally, the McKee court observed
that the absence of a gender-related variable made the data even less dependable. Id. Because
the statistics did not compare how many women were victims in nondomestic assaults with the
number of men who were the victims in domestic assaults, no program of gender-based discrimi-
nation could be inferred. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff did not prove that the
officers' inaction resulted from discrimination against a protected minority. Id. at 416.
135. Watson, 857 F.2d at 697.
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to protect her because of her status as a domestic assault victim, then
the defendant need only articulate a legitimate reason for the dispa-
rate treatment. 136 Notwithstanding the application of minimal scru-
tiny, some courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs when the defendants
failed even to satisfy this lesser standard.137
The second type of discrimination is based upon the sex of the vic-
tim. Commentators have argued that a police policy that devalues the
importance of domestic assaults has a disproportionate effect on
women because women comprise the vast majority of domestic vio-
lence victims. 138 If the plaintiff claims that the police department
failed to protect her because of her gender, then the defendants must
articulate an important governmental interest for the classification. 139
Despite the pro-plaintiff holding in Thurman, the difficulty with this
approach, as illustrated in Watson, is that the alleged differential treat-
ment is never embodied in any statutory classification and is thus
facially neutral. 140
The two-track inquiry set forth in Watson resulted from the
Supreme Court's analysis in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.141
The Court held in Feeney that a facially neutral classification with a
136. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 392 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied
sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part sub
nom. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Rational basis scrutiny is
appropriate because the discrimination does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right. Id.
137. Watson, 857 F.2d at 696; Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 394; Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595
F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984).
138. McFarlane, supra note 128, at 942. Domestic violence cases are narratives in which the
roles are type-cast: the nexus between victim and gender is constant. See Nadine Taub, Ex Parte
Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny,
9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 95 n.5 (1980) (stating that between approximately 1.8 and 3.3 million
women each year are beaten by their spouses while only 280,000 men are abused by their wives).
Another study demonstrated that 20 percent of husbands beat their wives on a regular basis:
from once a day to six times per year. JENNIFER BAKER FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 155
(1979). Other studies have indicated that a large proportion of women are victims of physical
violence at some point in their lives. Id. (up to 60 percent of all married women are victimized
by their husbands sometime during their marriage); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GEN-
DER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 237 (1989) (estimates between 55 percent and 50 per-
cent of all women are subject to some form of domestic violence during their lifetimes);
Brenneke, supra note 104, at 6 (estimates between 12 percent and 50 percent of all American
women). In 1990, 30 percent of the 4,399 women murder victims were slain by their husbands or
boyfriends. Id. See also RHODE, supra at 237 (one-third of all female homicide victims are killed
by a family member or male friend).
139. Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 392 (citing Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574
(W.D. Mich. 1986); Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1521).
140. Watson, 857 F.2d at 695-96.
141. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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disproportionate impact upon women is not unconstitutional. 42 In
that case, a Massachusetts statute gave preferential treatment for civil
service employment to veterans over non-veterans. 143 Because 98
percent of the veterans in the state were men, the statute operated
overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of women.144 Disproportionate
impact, while not irrelevant, does not by itself trigger strict scrutiny;145
instead, a showing of purposeful discrimination is "the condition that
offends the Constitution.' 46  For the Court in Feeney, however,
"awareness of consequences" did not demonstrate discriminatory pur-
pose.147 Intent "implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
142. Id. at 281. For the application of the Feeney test in the domestic violence context, see
Hathaway, supra note 112, at 684-87.
143. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
144. Id. at 270-72.
145. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
146. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971)). In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,
the Court noted the ways in which the discriminatory intent test could be satisfied: "Sometimes
a clear pattern [is] unexplainable on grounds other than race." 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). How-
ever, cases that fall into this first class are rare. The Court mentioned Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), as examples. Id. It also
stated that, absent such a stark pattern, "impact alone is not determinative." Id. Thus, the Court
looked to other evidence such as the historical background of the decision and the legislative or
administrative history. Id. at 267-68. The Court suggested that the evidentiary source should
take the form of a smoking gun: the historical background is relevant if "it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes." Id. at 267. The legislative history is germane
"where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of
its meetings, or reports." Id. at 268.
In light of Arlington Heights, one may ask why in domestic violence cases a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than gender, has not been identified, especially since the over-
whelming majority of victims are women? In other words, why are domestic assault cases not
placed within the same class as Gomillion or Yick Wo? On the disproportionate number of
women victims of domestic assaults, see McFarlane, supra note 128, at 942 n.78 (twenty-nine of
thirty domestic violence victims are women (citing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp.
1521, 1528 n.1 (D. Conn. 1984)); 95 percent of domestic assault victims were women (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983)); an estimated 97 percent of spousal abuse victims
were female (citing I. Silver, Police Civil Liability (MB) Form 9:1, at 2-23 n.6 (1990)).
One critic of the discriminatory purpose test observes that after Washington v. Davis every
racial discrimination suit involving a facially neutral statute "would be conducted as a search for
a bigoted decision-maker":
This "perpetrator perspective" sees contemporary racial discrimination not as a social
phenomenon - the historical legacy of centuries of slavery and subjugation - but as
the misguided, retrograde, almost atavistic behavior of individual actors in an enlight-
ened, egalitarian society. If such actors cannot be found - and the standards for find-
ing them are tough indeed - then there has been no violation of the Equal Protection
clause.
TRIBE, supra note 72, § 16-20, at 1507.
147. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'1 48
The intentionality requirement of Feeney mandated the conclusion in
Watson that even a showing of adverse impact would not overcome
the plaintiff's "heavy burden" to escape summary judgment. 149
C. Proving Discriminatory Intent:
Archaic and Overbroad Stereotypes
The heavy burden placed upon the plaintiff in Watson and other
post-Feeney domestic violence cases may be overcome by proving that
the differential treatment was the product of an archaic stereotype. 50
If a classification is found to be based on "archaic and over-broad
generalizations about women,' 5' then it is constitutionally infirm.
The Supreme Court, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,152
found the exclusion of men from a state nursing school invalid be-
cause it "tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an
exclusively woman's job.' 5 3 The Court in Hogan observed that even
though the test for judging the validity of a gender classification is
straightforward,
it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic
notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect"
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from
an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate. 154
The way around the Feeney burden is the road taken by the Court in
Hogan. A showing that a policy decision is engendered by stereotypic
considerations is proof of discriminatory intent, even if there is no ex-
plicit desire to harm a protected class. 55
The Hogan Court adopted a skeptical posture toward gender classi-
fications to guarantee that government action is "determined through
reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate assertions about the proper roles of men
148. Id. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976) (A "law, neutral on its face ...
is [not] invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater propor-
tion of one race than of another.").
149. 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1988).
150. Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitu-
tion Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 802-05 (1986).
151. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
152. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
153. Id. at 729.
154. Id. at 724-75.
155. Eppler, supra note 150, at 804.
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and women. ' 156 In other words, stereotypes promote laws that dis-
criminate because "they shortcut the process of being discriminat-
ing."'1 57 Stereotypical generalizations based upon sex are used as a
"proxy for other, more germane bases of classification,"'1 8 the stereo-
type substituting for the substantial relationship that must exist be-
tween the means and the governmental objective. 159
Two decisions illustrate how stereotypical language can be the basis
for an Equal Protection claim. The Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins160 shows the Court's approach to stereotypes
and discrimination in the employment context. The import of stereo-
types in the domestic violence context may then be examined in Balis-
treri v. Pacifica Police Department.'6'
1. Stereotypes and Proof of Discrimination: Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court defined the nexus between
stereotypes and differential treatment in ruling that discrimination on
the basis of gender stereotypes violated Title VII.162 In that case, Ann
Hopkins was proposed for partnership in a nationwide accounting
firm, the only woman among eighty-eight candidates that year.' 63
Although she developed more new business than any other candidate
and billed more hours, 64 the firm's policy committee decided to place
her on hold for one year as a result of negative evaluations. 165 Hop-
kins, according to the evaluations, was lacking in interpersonal skills:
she was described as "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, im-
patient with staff, and very demanding.' 66 Many of the partners
framed their criticisms in terms of sex: she was "macho," "overcom-
pensated for being a woman," and given to the unladylike habit of
156. 458 U.S. at 726.
157. Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 ARK. L. REV. 27, 28 (1990).
158. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
159. See Califano v. Westcott:
[T]he gender classification . . . is not substantially related to the attainment of any
important and valid statutory goals. It is, rather, part of the "baggage of sexual stereo-
types" ... that presumes the father has the "primary responsibility to provide a home
and its essentials, while the mother is the 'center of home and family life.'"
443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (citations omitted).
160. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
161. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); 490 U.S. at 258.
163. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
164. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
165. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
166. Id. at 234-35.
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swearing.167 To improve her chances for partnership, Hopkins was ad-
vised to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'1 68
The Court ruled that "stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence
that gender played a part" in an employment decision. 69 In forbid-
ding employers from discriminating against persons on the basis of
sex, "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.' 170
2. Stereotypes, Discrimination, and Domestic Violence: Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Department
In 1988, a year before Price Waterhouse and less than a year follow-
ing Watson, the Ninth Circuit in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Depart-
ment171 looked to a policeman's stereotypical words to determine
whether an Equal Protection claim was appropriate. In Balistreri, the
plaintiff, Jena, was severely beaten by her husband. 72 The officers
who responded to the call removed the husband from the residence,
but did not arrest him and were "rude, insulting and unsympathetic"
to Jena. 173 For the next several years, she was subjected to a campaign
of abuse: vandalism, harassing phone calls, and a firebomb.' 74 Al-
though she named her husband - whom she subsequently divorced
- as the suspect, the police steadfastly refused to intervene. 75 When
her former husband crashed his car into her garage, the police de-
clined to arrest her ex-spouse or to investigate the incident.176 After
Jena reported the acts of phone harassment and vandalism, the police
"received her complaints with ridicule," denied the existence of a pre-
viously issued restraining order, ignored her pleas for protection, and
on one occasion hung up on her.177 When Jena's house was
firebombed, the police took forty-five minutes to respond to her 911
167. Id. at 235.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 251. See also Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (disparaging
remarks by police calling plaintiff "nigger" and "coon" demonstrate racial animus and are suffi-
cient to support malicious prosecution claim violating Equal Protection Clause).
170. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702,707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971))).
171. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988).
172. Id. at 1423.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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call. 178 The police then questioned the husband but decided he was
not responsible. 179 After Jena criticized the inadequacy of the investi-
gation, the police replied that she should leave town or hire a private
investigator. 180
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to
survive a summary judgment motion. 18' The court noted in particular
an officer's alleged response to the first assault that left Jena with inju-
ries to her face and abdomen: the officer "did not blame plaintiff's
husband for hitting her, because of the way she was 'carrying on.' "82
"Such remarks," said the court, "strongly suggest an intention to treat
domestic abuse cases less seriously than other assaults, as well as an
animus against abused women.' 83 The officer's pro-defendant atti-
tude is capable of several interpretations: perhaps he believed that
women simply occupy a subordinate role in the family structure, that
Jena Balistreri was a bad girl who deserved punishment, or that state
officials should not intrude upon the family unit. 84 Whatever the rea-
son, the officer's language reflects an "increasingly outdated miscon-
ception concerning the role of females"' 85 that cannot be used as a
source of differential treatment. On the basis of stereotypical lan-
guage, then, the court ruled for Jena on the Equal Protection claim.' 86
In terms of the evolution of domestic violence case law, Doe v.
Calumet City is more closely related to Balistreri than to Watson.
Whereas Watson concentrated upon the differential treatment ac-
corded domestic violence victims based upon statistical evidence and
police training, Balistreri identified stereotypic language as evidence
of discriminatory purpose. The Doe court then extended the Balistreri
analysis: whereas in Balistreri the stereotypical assumptions were
briefly articulated and obvious, in Doe the assumptions were less obvi-
ous but no less illegitimate.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1427.
182. Id. at 1423, 1427.
183. Id. at 1427.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 309-10 (listing reasons given by the police for their
failure to intervene).
185. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976).
186. Balestreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d at 1427. The Thurman court rejected any
stereotypical justification for wife beating: "Today ... any notion of a husband's prerogative to
physically discipline his wife is an 'increasingly outdated misconception.' As such it must join
other 'archaic and overbroad' premises which have been rejected as unconstitutional." 595 F.
Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984) (citations omitted).
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Watson's focus upon governmental means and ends is not unrelated
to Balistreri's emphasis on animus against a burdened class. If the
governmental justification does not rely on "reasoned analysis" but on
"the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assump-
tions about the proper roles of men and women,"' 187 then the requisite
direct nexus between the objective and the means will probably be
absent. 188 If a purported police objective "reflects archaic and stereo-
typic notions" regarding women, the Supreme Court has held "the ob-
jective itself is illegitimate."'1 89
II. SUBJECt OPINION190
A. The Trial Court's Decision
Jane, on behalf of herself and her children, brought suit in Illinois
state court against Calumet City, the police officers, and the police
departments to which the officers belonged. 191 The plaintiffs alleged
five counts against the defendants: (1) negligence grounded upon a
duty to protect or special relationship; (2) loss of society; (3) family
expense; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) gender
discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.192 In 1990, the Circuit
Court of Cook County dismissed the complaint. 193
In its treatment of the gender discrimination claim, the court ap-
plied different analyses to the municipality and to Officer Horka.194
Because the plaintiffs had not alleged that Calumet City had adopted
a policy of discrimination and because Horka was not a high-level of-
ficer - that is, not a policymaker - the court struck the allegation
against the city.195 The circuit court was also unsympathetic to the
Equal Protection claim against Horka. It analyzed Horka's language
187. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
188. Id. at 725-26.
189. Id. at 725.
190. See supra notes 1-43 and accompanying text (presenting facts of the case).
191. The suit was filed in state, not federal, court because of the plaintiffs' perception that the
Seventh Circuit would be less tolerant of a special relationship Due Process claim. Interview
with Clifford Zimmerman, attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, DePaul University College of Law,
Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 18, 1994). The plaintiffs' perception proved correct. Before Doe was filed in
1988, the Seventh Circuit decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987). Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' decision. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
On DeShaney's negative impact on Due Process claims brought by domestic violence victims,
see supra note 104.
192. Appellants' Brief app. at II.A.
193. Id. at I.A.1, I.A.2.
194. Id. at II.A.8.
195. Id. at II.A.8-9.
146 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:123
when he described Jane to his commander and the other officers: as
"an hysterical woman" who was "freaking out" and "not coherent
anymore."'1 96 To the court, the remarks connoted no invidious distinc-
tion but merely denoted Horka's innocent characterization of a dis-
tressed woman.197 To suppose otherwise would "carr[y] gender-based
discrimination an awful long way."'1 98
The plaintiffs argued that evidence for a valid Equal Protection
claim was demonstrated by Horka's rude tone of voice and through
questions he directed to Jane: "Where is your husband?" "Do you
know the guy?" "Why would you leave your children in the apartment
if there was a strange man there, and why did you leave your apart-
ment without the key?"'199 Horka's questions revealed his stereotypi-
cal assumption: that he had responded to a domestic disturbance, and
therefore, a non-interventionist approach was appropriate. 200 The
court read the officer's speech in a literalist fashion, 20' denied that any
archaic stereotype could be identified, and dismissed the cause of
action.20 2
B. The Appellate Court's Opinion
Jane appealed the circuit court's order, relying upon Price
Waterhouse20 3 on the question of stereotyping and on Watson2°4 and
Lowers v. City of Streator205 on the issue of domestic violence. In
1992, the Appellate Court of Illinois, by a 3-0 vote, affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court on the sex discrimination claim.206
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id. app. at II.B.4-7.
198. Id. at IL.B.4.
199. Id. at II.B.5-6.
200. Id. at II.B.6.
201. By "literalist," the author is not suggesting that the trial judge consciously applied a form
of strict constructionism to Horka's alleged speech. The author uses the term to indicate that the
judge confined himself to the words in the complaint and refused to draw any inferential conclu-
sions from the record.
202. Appellants' Brief app. at I.A.2.
203. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between ste-
reotypes and discrimination in Price Waterhouse).
204. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to the domestic violence context in Watson).
205. 627 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. I11. 985).
206. Doe v. Calumet City, 609 N.E.2d 689, 700 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992). The vote to sustain the
special duty negligence claim was 2-1. Justice Manning, in her dissent, argued that the
majority decision ... relieves the City of Calumet City and its police officers of any
obligation to do more than show-up at the scene of a crime. Once at the scene, they are
free to stand by and observe without incurring liability for their action, likened to spec-
tators at a wrestling match. This is true even if the officers have special knowledge that
harm will be done to a victim who cries out for help.
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The court found that all the cases relied upon by Jane were distin-
guishable on the facts.20 7 Whereas in Price Waterhouse the Supreme
Court found a smoking gun in the plaintiff's employment file,20 8 in
Doe Jane had not demonstrated that Horka's remarks were based on
preconceived notions about women.2 9 Further, the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse proved that her employer "in no way disclaimed reliance
on the sex-linked evaluations. '210 Jane, by contrast, had not made
such a showing.211 The court believed that Jane had also not demon-
strated that Horka had a pattern of asking these types of questions of
women nor that he would not have put the same questions to a man in
a similar predicament.212
The court also concluded that Jane's reliance upon two domestic
violence cases, Watson and Lowers, was misplaced.213 In Watson, the
plaintiff alleged an unwritten policy or custom of differential treat-
ment and, in support, offered statistical evidence of disproportionate
impact.214 In Lowers, the plaintiff submitted evidence detailing a pat-
tern of inaction over a six-month period that indicated a policy by the
defendant to discourage vigorous prosecution of violent crimes
against women. 215 In contrast to the court's position, Jane Doe ar-
gued that she need not prove the existence of a municipal policy or
custom. 216 In the alternative, if a policy must be shown, Jane pointed
to Calumet City's unconstitutional policy of strip searching female ar-
restees. 21 7 The majority, however, found the nexus between the strip
search policy and Horka's language too attenuated 218 and affirmed the
circuit court on the dismissal of the Equal Protection claim. 219
Id. at 703.
207. Id. at 698.
208. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the gender-
based comments in Price Waterhouse).
209. 609 N.E.2d at 698.
210. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 699.
216. Id.
217. Id. See Doe v. Calumet City, 754 F. Supp. 1211, 1212-15 (N.D. II. 1990) (discussing
Calumet City's unconstitutional policy of strip searching female arrestees). Although bearing
identical case names, the plaintiff in the 1994 case is not a member of the class in the earlier case.
218. The court noted that the Supreme Court required that "[a]t the very least there must be
an affirmative link between the policy and the particular violation alleged." Doe v. Calumet
City, 609 N.E.2d 689, 699 ([Il. App. Ct. 1992) (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823 (1985)).
219. Id.
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C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court, by a unanimous vote, reversed
the appellate court on the state tort claims.220 On the federal gender
discrimination claim, the court, by a 5-2 margin, found that Jane had
made out a cognizable claim against Horka and Calumet City.221 Be-
cause of the different requirements for personal liability and munici-
pality liability, the court separated the gender discrimination count
between the individual officer and the municipality.222
1. The Majority Opinion
a. Section 1983 claim against Horka
The court applied a contextualist,223 totality-of-the circumstances
approach to Horka's language and the surrounding factual circum-
stances. When Horka addressed Jane, she had just suffered a sexual
attack and had escaped from Valentine in her undergarments. 224 She
related to Horka her fear for her children, who remained trapped with
the suspect.225 Against this backdrop, not considered by the lower
courts, Horka's "rude and demeaning tone" of questioning was sus-
pect and suggestive of sex discrimination.226 Other incongruous fac-
tors, unexplainable otherwise, make sense if one adopts Horka's
stereotypical perspective. According to the court, Horka's discrimina-
tory attitude explained why the officer stated that Jane was not "co-
herent," while her neighbors had no trouble comprehending her.227
He also referred to Jane, a woman old enough to have two children, as
a "girl. ' 228 A reasonable trier of fact, the court held, could determine
that Horka's conduct demonstrated he discredited Jane's statements
because she was a woman. 229
220. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498,503-09 (Il1. 1994). The state tort claims were negli-
gence based upon a special duty relationship and upon willful and wanton conduct, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Id. The court rejected the negligence claim based upon a
special duty relationship, but found for the plaintiff on the remaining tort theories. Id.
221. Id. at 509-12.
222. Id. at 509.
223. By "contextualist," the author is referring to a mode of interpretation that makes use of
the historical and structural context of the text.
224. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 510.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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The court cited Thurman2 30 and Balistreri231 as precedents support-
ing potential Equal Protection violations where police failed to re-
spond to domestic violence complaints lodged by women.2 32 Jane
Doe, like Tracey Thurman and Jena Balistreri, was assaulted. She no-
tified the police, but was ignored, and the violence continued.2 33 The
court also examined Horka's questions to Jane: e.g., was the attacker
her husband?2 34 The court placed these questions within their factual
setting: they were addressed after Jane informed the officer of Valen-
tine's attack and after Horka decided not to break down the door.235
The court acknowledged, as the lower courts had concluded, that the
officer's words were capable of an innocent construction.2 36 Nonethe-
less, placed against the backdrop of Horka's conduct towards Jane, a
reasonable trier of fact could infer that the officer dismissed Jane's
plea "because he continually believed this was a domestic situation
less deserving of his attention. 2 37 Applying the equal protection
methodology for gender-based classifications, the court stated that
"[s]uch conduct is not at all related to any governmental purpose. 2 38
b. Section 1983 claim against Calumet City
Lastly, the court considered Jane's sex discrimination claim against
Calumet City. The majority listed the two elements for municipal lia-
bility in a Section 1983 action: the plaintiffs must establish that (1)
they were deprived of a constitutional interest; and (2) that the depri-
vation was caused by the government's policy or custom. 239 Because
the court had already concluded that Jane had stated a cognizable
claim of gender discrimination, the sole issue remaining was whether
the constitutional injury was caused by an official custom, policy, or
usage of the city.240
230. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale and significance
of Thurman).
231. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale and significance
of Balistreri).
232. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 510 (I11. 1994).
233. See id. at 502-03 (illustrating the excessive amount of time taken by the police to act on
Jane Doe's plea for help).
234. Id.
235. Id. The court observed that Horka's questions were irrelevant given the danger posed by
Valentine: "Whether the attacker was Jane's husband or someone she knew would not change
the nature of the attack on Jane or the danger to Betty and John." Id. at 510.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 511 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
240. Id.
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To demonstrate that Calumet City engaged in a policy or custom of
gender discrimination, Jane alleged five factors: (1) the conduct of
Horka on the morning of December 20, 1987; (2) Calumet City's prac-
tice between 1982 and 1987 of strip-searching women who had been
arrested for non-felony offenses;241 (3) the city's ratification of the dis-
parate treatment of women by failing to implement a counter-policy
to the strip-search practice; (4) the city's ratification of Horka's con-
duct by failing to discipline him for sex discrimination; 242 and (5) the
sexist jokes made at the scene by other officers. 243
When viewed individually, the Court found, many of these factors
did not rise to the level of municipal policy.2 " In other words, Horka
as a rank-and-file officer did not have the power to issue edicts repre-
senting municipal policy.245 Further, the strip-search policy was not
the "cause" of Horka's actions; there must be an "affirmative link be-
tween the policy and the particular constitutional violation in-
volved. '246 Moreover, the failure of Calumet City to institute a policy
to counteract the strip-search practice was too attenuated to be the
proximate cause of Jane's constitutional injury.2 47
Because Jane did not show that the conduct of Calumet City policy-
makers was implicated, she needed to rely on a showing of custom. 248
According to the majority, Jane satisfied this burden. She had not
merely pleaded facts implicating "one rogue officer. '249 Rather, the
court adopted a contextualist approach that considered the actions
and inaction of Horka and the city as part of an interrelated whole.250
The majority held that a reasonable trier of fact could determine that
"gender discrimination in general was so settled and widespread that
the policymakers had either constructive or actual notice of such
conduct." 251
241. See Doe v. Calumet City, 754 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that the strip
searches were unconstitutional).
242. Whereas the Calumet City Fire and Police Commission found Horka guilty of five mis-
conduct charges, Karwath, supra note 30, at C1, none of the charges concerned sex
discrimination.
243. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 511 (I11. 1994).
244. Id. at 512.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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2. The Dissent
Two justices joined in dissenting from the majority's opinion on the
Equal Protection claim.252 The dissent asserted that a cause of action
does not lie "whenever someone is offended by the frictions that occur
from day-to-day human contact. 12 53 In support of its thesis, the dis-
sent recast the plaintiffs' complaint twice, once in paraphrase and
once by quoting from nine paragraphs from the complaint.2 54 The dis-
sent concluded as it began:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee that a student of
Emily Post or Amy Vanderbilt will arrive at the scene when one
calls the police for assistance. Section 1983 does not provide a cause
of action whenever a word or phrase is spoken which happens to be
on the current list of politically incorrect utterances. Neither the
Constitution nor the Federal statutes require officers to speak tact-
fully or deferentially to a person because of his or her gender.255
In sum, the dissent found Jane's claim of gender discrimination "un-
tenable and, indeed, wholly ridiculous. '256
252. Id. at 513-14 (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ., dissenting).
253. Id. at 513 (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ., dissenting). The dissent's reasoning was anticipated
by Thomas J. Tyrrell, Horka's defense attorney in the 1988 dismissal hearing. Tyrrell was in-
formed that several witnesses would testify against his client because Horka "wasn't real nice" in
responding to their requests that he break into the apartment. Rob Karwath, Tape May Hold
Fate of Officer in Calumet City Rape Incident, Cmi. TIB., Mar. 15, 1988, at C4. Tyrrell, in reply,
stated: "He's not going to get an award for being Officer Friendly .... But that's not why you
discharge a policeman, because he wasn't compassionate." Id.
254. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 513-14 (I11. 1994) (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ.,
dissenting).
255. Id. at 514 (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ., dissenting).
256. Id. (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ., dissenting). A major flaw in the dissent's approach is that
its criticism is directed at the wrong claim. The dissent argued that a gender discrimination claim
does not lie when someone is offended by the frictions and irritations of everyday life. See supra
note 255 and accompanying text. But Jane never argued that it did. It is not necessary that the
person "making an alleged illegitimate distinction be Attila the Hun. Malice and evil will are not
the constitutional standards. '[P]urposeful discrimination is the "condition that offends the Con-
stitution." "' McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409, 422 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover, it is not necessary that the constitutional injury have a
devastating effect. According to the congressional debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act, from which
Section 1983 was derived, "'[t]he deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the
damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five dollars or even five cents; they
may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages."' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)
(quoting CONo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 216 (1871) (statement of Sen. Thurman)).
Instead, to state a Section 1983 action against officer Horka, Jane alleged that Horka, acting
under color of state law, deprived her of a federal right. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 509 (citing Fellhauer
v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 879 (Il1. 1991) (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980))). To state her Section 1983 action against Calumet City, Jane alleged that a municipal
policy deprived her of a constitutionally protected interest. Id. at 511 (citing Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Jane claimed that the defendants denied her equal protection because she was a woman, not
that she was personally offended by an officer's unchivalrous comments. The dissent's argument
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The Illinois courts focused their analyses on the language ex-
changed by Jane and Horka: what their words represented on a
purely textual level and what they signified or failed to signify on a
subtextual level. The analysis section of this Note will also concen-
trate on the linguistic effect of the participants' language. To do this
properly, the Note first sets the scene by outlining the chronology as
pled versus the appellate court's fictional version. Next, the section
includes an extended discussion of stereotypes, or what might be
termed an identification and critique of the unspoken text situated
below the spoken word.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Jane's Story: Interpretation and Misinterpretation
At one level, the crime described by Jane to Horka, Horka's reac-
tion, and the interpretation of three courts to the description and reac-
tion may be approached in terms of the mechanics of interpretation,
of how a woman's story of sexualized violence remains suspect and is
vulnerable to attack as unbelievable.2 57 Jane, after escaping from the
apartment, told her narrative to Horka: Valentine had sexually as-
saulted her and had threatened her two children. Horka misread the
story, bypassing the text's literal level and substituting instead the
more congenial and familiar account of a domestic dispute.
Having preempted Jane's story with one of his own, Horka's seem-
ingly irrelevant questions and posture of inaction made sense given
the premises of his narrative. As his questions reveal, if the attacker
were her husband or boyfriend, perhaps Jane was not entirely blame-
is applicable to Jane's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than to the civil
rights claim. The majority, in analyzing the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
differentiated actionable conduct that is both extreme and outrageous from "'mere insults, in-
dignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities' that are part of the costs of
complex society from which the law provides no protection." Id. at 507 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). See also W. PAoE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 59 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is no occasion for the law to
intervene with balm for wounded feelings in every case where a flood of billingsgate is loosed in
an argument over a back fence."); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936) ("Against a large part of the frictions and
irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain
toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.").
Ironically, the dissent joined the majority opinion in holding that Jane stated a cause of action
for mental distress. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 513 (Heiple and Bilandic, JJ., dissenting).
257. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and
the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 123, 123 (1992). See also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a
Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259
(1993) (arguing that the law refuses to recognize the indirect speech patterns used by women
defendants and therefore ignores the intended exercise of constitutional rights).
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less.258 As the text of Jane's complaint was successively read by the
three state courts, her story and Horka's reworking of it were subject
to further glosses, retellings, and interpretive corrections. However,
to argue that a series of misreadings distorted Jane's authentic narra-
tive and compounded the original crime is not to repeat the fashiona-
ble tenet that the essence of interpreting consists of "forcing,
adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, [and] falsify-
ing.",259 Rather, it is important to recognize that the Illinois Supreme
Court produced a superior reading of Jane's story, an interpretation
that respected Jane's authorial intention and placed her story within
the appropriate cultural history.
B. Just the Facts
In order to understand correctly how a piece of evidence functions
or how language should be construed, the evidence or language must
be placed in its context. The reasonability of this proposition is self-
evident. Nonetheless, the Illinois Appellate Court abused this funda-
mental evidentiary and interpretive principle when it reworked the
context to give the factual circumstances, from the defendants' per-
spective, a coherence and consistency that was altogether lacking.
The appellate court's rendition retells the story of how Horka
should have acted or rather how the court wished the narrative should
have come out. By manipulating the chronology and deemphasizing
parts of the complaint,260 Horka's actions were granted an air of rea-
sonability and respectability. However, the original, unrevised chron-
ological sequence, as laid out in the complaint, preserves Horka's
unreasonable conduct and buttresses the Equal Protection claim. As
pled by Jane, Horka announced his refusal to enter the apartment,
after which he questioned Jane about whether the suspect was her
husband.261 In other words, before he asked his leading questions, the
officer had drawn his own conclusion: this was a domestic dispute.262
258. If, as Horka's questions assume, Jane knew her attacker, then she was not "really" raped.
Instead, hers would be a case of "simple" rape, which implies that Jane may have contributed to
or assumed the risk of injury. On the difference between real and simple rape, see infra note
269.
259. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Genealogy of Morals, in BAsIC WRITINGs OF NIETZSCHE 587
(Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., The Modem Library 1968) (1887).
260. One telling change of emphasis occurred in the description of Horka's arrival at the
scene. Compare the detailed account in the complaint, Appellants' Brief at 8-9, with the court's
expurgated version, Doe v. Calumet City, 609 N.E.2d 689, 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
261. Appellants' Brief at 9-10.
262. The first thing the supreme court did was to get the chronology right and to include in its
analysis a representative sample of Horka's language. The appellate court was willing to deny
any stereotypical import to Horka's remarks because, considered in the abstract, the words ap-
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Horka's refusal to act is consonant with the traditional police ap-
proach to domestic assaults which is to accord them a less serious sta-
tus than other assaults.2 63 The devaluation of domestic crimes
burdens a particular set of victims, giving rise to an impermissible gen-
der-based classification that violates the Equal Protection Clause.264
peared less patently the product of an archaic generalization than, for example, the employer's
remarks did in Price Waterhouse. Of course, Horka's words were not written down for purposes
of an internal and confidential memo, as were the remarks in Price Waterhouse. Believing their
words to be private, the partners at Price Waterhouse could afford to be offensive.
263. See infra notes 309-10 and accompanying text (enumerating reasons police choose not to
intervene in domestic assaults).
264. The Fourteenth Amendment directs that all persons who are similarly situated should be
treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). One way in
which discriminatory conduct may be measured is to determine what a government's well-estab-
lished procedures are and how state actors deviate from them in their treatment of one group of
persons. Id. The government has an obligation not to draw "illegitimate distinctions among
those to whom the government provides services." McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d
409, 418 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J. dissenting). An examination of standard police operating
procedure - and Horka's deviations from it - underscores the Equal Protection claim.
When Officer Horka arrived upon the scene at 4:39 a.m., he took a supervisory role and as-
sumed control of the scene. Appellants' Brief at 8. As police procedure manuals point out,
proper procedure entails more than merely surrounding the apartment building and making ten-
tative efforts to test the door locks and shine spotlights into windows. Rather, the police officers
should have acted in an expeditious manner to avert the crime and to protect the victims from
any further attack. 1 CHARLES P. RUNKEL ET AL, THE ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
271, 286 (1989); 2 RUNKEL ET AL., supra, at 219. Horka also deviated from established proce-
dure by discounting Jane's statements. Training texts advise police that the victims of crimes are
typically the best source of information and their statements should be regarded as reliable. Id.
at 224. By contrast, the conduct of Inspector Miller, who acted "by the book," exemplifies good
police work. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing Miller's role in entering
the apartment and apprehending Valentine). For Miller, the gender of the victim did not matter.
Had Horka questioned Jane in line with established police procedure, he would have asked
her about substantive matters regarding the crime in progress: details about the suspect's ap-
pearance or whether he was armed. Appellants' Brief at 32. Instead, Horka's questions sug-
gesting that Jane knew her attacker were, as the supreme court observed, beside the point.
"Whether the attacker was Jane's husband or someone she knew would not change the nature of
the attack on Jane or the danger to Betty and John." Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 510
(I1. 1994). The incongruity of Horka's line of questioning is laid bare if one reconstructs the facts
with John Doe replacing Jane Doe. If a man had appeared half-clothed in the middle of a De-
cember night and pleaded with the police to save his children from an intruder, it is virtually
inconceivable that Horka would respond, "Where is your wife?" or "Why would you leave your
children in the apartment if there was a strange woman there?" Unlikely as it may seem, such a
scenario was proposed and accepted by both the circuit court and the appellate court. Appel-
lants' Brief at 33; Doe, 609 N.E.2d at 698. The officer's comments only make sense if one adopts
Horka's stereotypical perspective. Absent the stereotype, the questions lack any logical
framework.
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C. Stereotypical Assumptions and Doe v. Calumet City
1. Sexual Assault, Stereotypes, and the Problem of Belief
Horka's failure to take Jane at her word - that she had been sexu-
ally assaulted - and his depiction of her as an incoherent, hysterical
woman are symptomatic of a widely recognized stereotype: society's
deep-seated distrust of the female rape victim. 265 The problem of be-
lief and fear of the false rape charge were noted two centuries ago by
the Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale. Though "rape is a most detest-
able crime," according to Hale, "it is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party ac-
cused, tho never so innocent. '266 Hale's influential dictate 267 along
with special evidentiary requirements used for rape cases 268 are em-
blematic of the institutionalization of the law's distrust of women
victims. 26
9
The timeliness of Hale's seventeenth-century instruction was
brought home in The 1990 Report of the Illinois Task Force on Gender
Bias in the Courts. The Task Force Report observed that "[u]ntil re-
cently, the police routinely minimized and discounted rape com-
265. Although, to be precise, Jane was sexually assaulted and not raped, the distinction is
without a difference for the analysis.
266. 1 SIR MATrRtEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (Philadelphia, Rob-
ert M. Small 1847).
267. Camille E. LeGrand, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV.
919, 932 (1973) (noting that Hale's direction, "quoted by virtually every legal writer who has
discussed rape," was in 1973 preserved nearly verbatim in California's jury instructions).
268. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-56, 63 (1987) (discussing requirements for victim
resistance, corroboration, sexual history, cautionary jury instructions, fresh complaint, and
force). These extraordinary procedural requirements serve to place the rape victim on trial. See
also NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT. CONFRONTINO RAPE IN
AMERICA 129-66 (1976) (discussing the many obstacles a rape victim must overcome); RHODE,
supra note 138, at 246-49; Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977) (discussing the problems with a judicial system which in
effect puts the victim on trial); Pamela Lakes Wood, Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case:
A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 349-51 (1973) (discussing the investigative proce-
dure a victim must go through before she is faced with the ordeal of trial).
269. ESTRICH, supra note 268, at 28. In her original and influential book, Estrich distinguishes
between what she terms "real" or traditional rape and "simple" or non-traditional rape. Id. at 2-
7. Real rape is an aggravated assault by a stranger. Id. at 4. Simple rape is an assault by an
acquaintance or spouse and does not include any aggravating factors. Id. Whereas real rape is
prosecuted more frequently and more successfully than other violent crimes, society is less will-
ing to prosecute those accused of simple rape. Id. The paradox in Doe v. Calumet City is that
Jane, a victim of sexual assault and threatened with real rape, was treated as the victim of a
simple rape; Horka's reclassification of Jane's status as a victim allows for the discrediting of
Jane's statements and implicitly opens the door to a host of stereotypical doubts: Did she ask for
it? Did she assume the risk? Did she resist?
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plaints" 270 and "suspicion of rape victims' credibility" was at the heart
of the problem.271 Despite the efforts of many Illinois police depart-
ments to increase the sensitivity of law enforcement personnel to vic-
tims, 272 the Task Force admitted that some officers retain a
stereotypical distrust towards women victims. 273
The Task Force Report explains in part the facts of an earlier Illinois
case, Lowers v. City of Streator,274 a case the appellate court in Doe
distinguished as inapplicable. 275 In Lowers, a man broke into the
plaintiff's home and raped her.276 Emily Lowers immediately re-
ported the crime to the police department, and identified the suspect
from police photographs.277 After an investigation of the crime scene,
one officer told Emily he had seen situations similar to hers and
warned her the suspect would return and rape again.278 About once a
week thereafter, Emily inquired of the police about the progress of
the investigation and offered to identify the rapist in a lineup.279 De-
spite her efforts, the police department took no action.2 80 The of-
ficer's prediction proved accurate: some months later, the same man
broke into Emily's house and raped her again.281
Emily Lowers was successful in stating Equal Protection and Due
Process claims,282 but the case still illustrates the problem of belief for
sexual assault victims. Although she gave a statement, provided a de-
scription of the rapist, identified him from photographs, submitted to
and passed a polygraph examination, and followed up with the police
270. THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 101
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. According to the Task Force Report the Chicago Police
Department in 1982 "unfounded" 48 percent of reported rapes. Id. Police use the term "un-
found" to describe reported offenses which they have failed to investigate to solution or have
categorized as non-offenses. The Task Force Report also noted that a similarly high rate of un-
founded cases existed in Chicago's suburbs, such as Calumet City. Id.
271. "The credibility of sexual assault victims is mistrusted to a degree which is not typical of
other crimes." Id. at 104. Attorneys surveyed for the Task Force Report said that almost half of
the dismissals in sexual assault cases are because "state's attorney and police don't believe victim
[sic]." Id. at 106. Forty percent of the prosecutors and 50 percent of the defense attorneys
subscribed to this belief. Id.
272. Id. at 102.
273. Id. at 106.
274. 627 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
275. 609 N.E.2d 689, 698 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
276. 627 F. Supp. at 245.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 246.47.
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on a weekly basis,2 83 the defendants, in the words of the Task Force
Report, "routinely minimized and discounted" her story.284 The of-
ficers' distrust of Emily Lowers' credibility is analogous to Officer
Horka's suspicion of Jane's complaint. In each case, the word of a
sexual assault victim was ignored, and police inaction further exacer-
bated the violence.
Hale was skeptical of rape charges because the accusations are eas-
ily made but difficult to defend, even by an innocent party. Horka
provided another reason: the source of the charge, Jane Doe, fit the
stereotypical pattern of the hysterical woman.
2. Hysteria, Stereotypes, and the Problem of Belief
In a taped radio transmission of the Calumet City incident, Horka
told a police dispatcher he did not know whether the crime involved a
rape.285 Horka's willful denial of what Jane had experienced and what
her daughter was presently experiencing2 86 was the result, according
to Horka, of Jane's unstable, hysterical condition.2 87 Horka's diagno-
sis of Jane as a woman overborne by hysteria epitomizes the officer's
stereotypical perspective, which made it easier for him to devalue
Jane's credibility. Hysteria has always been defined as a peculiarly
female phenomenon and has also carried with it a pejorative connota-
tion.2 88 The condition entailed an emotional regression and instability
283. Id. at 245.
284. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 270, at 101.
285. When the dispatcher asked whether the incident was a rape, Horka replied: "I don't
know. I don't know what this is right now." Karwath, supra note 30, at C1.
286. At the end of the nearly half hour ordeal, Betty was repeatedly raped and forced to
perform deviate sexual acts. Appellants' Brief at 12.
287. Id. at 10. See also Karwath, supra note 30, at C1 (indicating that, according to Horka's
defense attorney, the officer did not rescue Betty immediately because Jane was "'hysterical'
and couldn't clearly tell Horka what had happened").
288. CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT. VISIONS OF GENDER IN VIcrO-
RIAN AMERICA 197 (1985). Though hysteria was one of the classic diseases of the nineteenth
century, modem psychiatrists continue to recognize the hysterical personality, which they de-
scribe as one characterized by "excitability, emotional instability, over-reactivity, self-dramatiza-
tion, attention seeking, immaturity, vanity and unusual dependence." Id. at 197, 212.
Hysteria has been defined as a quintessentially female ailment. 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY 586 (2d ed. 1989) ("Women being much more liable than men to this disorder, it was
originally thought to be due to a disturbance of the uterus and its functions."). See also McKee
v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409, 425 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J. dissenting) ("In the
linguistic history of our society, it is common to find women referred to as hysterical; it is uncom-
mon to find references to hysterical men.").
Unable to discover an organic etiology for the disease, many nineteenth-century physicians
believed that hysteria derived from "'the reflex effects of utero-ovarian irritation."' SMITH-Ro-
SENBERG, supra, at 204 (quoting THOMAS MORE MADDEN, CLINICAL GYNECOLOGY 474 (1895)).
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that was rooted in a woman's very nature.289 By terming Jane "hyster-
ical," Horka invoked the social construct290 of Jane as a dependent,
fragile, and emotional figure.291
Horka's diagnosis of Jane is comparable to how the defendant of-
ficers in McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas292 treated another battered
woman. When Gayla McKee complained to police officers that her
boyfriend had beaten her, threatened to kill her, and disabled her car
to prevent her from escaping, the officers replied that she exaggerated
the threats and that she should talk matters out with her boyfriend.2 93
After she requested that the officers take her to the station so she
could file a complaint, the officers responded that once she had
calmed down she would probably decide not to file.294 Judge
Goldberg, writing in dissent, found the treatment Gayla received to be
in keeping with the image of the febrile woman as hysteric.295 The
hysterical woman is paranoiac, exaggerating threatened violence, who,
when allowed to calm down and consider the matter rationally, will
decide not to take any action. Undoubtedly, Gayla McKee and Jane
Doe were upset: both were recent victims of sexualized violence that
promised to strike again. But their emotional reactions, given the sur-
rounding circumstances, were entirely rational and understandable,
not irrational and hysterical.2 96
By labelling Jane "hysterical," Horka also calls into question the
reliability of her word. If Jane were emotionally disturbed or enfee-
bled, then her account of her sexual assault might be discounted. The
nineteenth-century medical notion of the hysteric as highly impres-
sionable and suggestible was legitimized in legal circles early in the
twentieth century by John Henry Wigmore, author of the most cele-
289. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 288, at 206. The female nervous system, physicians ar-
gued, was physiologically more sensitive. Id. Other doctors believed that woman's blood was
thinner than man's, resulting in nutritional inadequacies to the central nervous system. Id.
Many also assumed that hysteria was closely tied to woman's reproductive cycle. Id.
290. See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrTY 104-05 (Robert Hurley trans.
1978) (discussing the hysterization of women's bodies, a nineteenth-century figure invested by
the deployment of sexuality).
291. Historically, physicians were concerned that hysteria was a functional illness rather than
a true organic malady. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 288, at 204. The hysterical woman was,
not surprisingly, described as emotionally indulgent, morally weak, and lacking in willpower. Id.
at 205. This judgment was affirmed by Oliver Wendell Holmes who described "a hysterical girl
[as] a vampire who sucks the blood of the healthy people about her." Id. at 207 (citing S. WEIR
MITCHELL, FAT AND BLOOD 37 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1881)).
292. 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989).
293. Id. at 410.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 425.
296. Id.; Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 510 (Ill. 1994).
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brated treatise on evidence.2 97 Wigmore maintained that the mental
distress of "errant young girls and women" could very well produce a
rape accusation that was easily made but hard to prove: "Their
psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent de-
fects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by
bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emo-
tional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men. '298 Wigmore conjoins
the notion of the unstable hysteric with Hale's suspicion of women
victims.2 99 Horka draws upon this stereotypical matrix to reduce the
power of Jane's speech and rewrite the plot of the crime, translating a
sexual assault into a domestic assault.
3. Domestic Violence, Stereotypes, and the Problem of Police
Inaction
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Horka's questions - e.g.,
was the attacker her husband? - indicated that the officer dismissed
Jane's plea for immediate action because he believed that the incident
was a "domestic situation less deserving of his attention. ' 300 As with
society's deep-seated distrust of the rape victim and the hysteric, the
definitions and causes of domestic violence are socially constructed. 301
Our modem response or, perhaps more precisely, lack of response, to
domestic violence has been conditioned through our culture, particu-
larly our legal culture. Eighteenth-century English common law gave
to the husband the right to physically discipline his wife.302 Subse-
quently, American common law followed suit.30 3
297. 3A WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736-37 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)
(1904).
298. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 297, § 924a, at 736.
299. HALE, supra note 266, at 635.
300. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 510.
301. RHODE, supra note 138, at 237. See also LINDA GoRDoN, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIvEs:
THE POLMrcs AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 3 (1988) ("[Tjhe very definition of what
constitutes unacceptable domestic violence, and appropriate responses to it, developed and then
varied according to political moods and the force of certain political movements."); Robin L.
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (noting that women's suffering is dismissed by
legal culture and suggesting a new critical focus on the felt experience of women's subjective,
hedonic lives).
302. Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for
Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 79 (1983).
303. Id. One limitation on the right of chastisement was the proverbial "rule of thumb,"
which denoted the size of the rod with which a husband could legally beat his wife. Id.
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This disciplinary right was codified by William Blackstone in his au-
thoritative commentaries on the common law.3°4 Because the hus-
band is to answer for his wife's misbehavior, "the law thought it
reasonable to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by do-
mestic chastisement. ' 30 5 By the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, courts began expressly to repudiate the common law right of
chastisement, 30 6 and by 1870 most American states had declared the
practice illegal. 30 7
But despite the criminalization of spousal abuse, enforcement of the
law has proved tenuous at best. Traditional police practices have im-
plicitly endorsed the common law attitude expressed by Blackstone by
preferring not to intervene in domestic disturbances.30 8 Police depart-
ments have advanced a panoply of justifications for official inaction in
spousal abuse cases: (1) deference to family privacy; (2) avoiding
arrest because a man's home is his castle; (3) the preservation of pri-
vate marital affairs from the intervention of the criminal justice sys-
tem; (4) unofficial sanction within the couple's culture; (5) wife abuse
as a victimless crime, or at best, a minor crime; (6) high complainant
attrition rate; (7) the husband's retaliation against the wife after his
release; (8) the family's inability to afford the economic deprivation of
the husband's absence from work; (9) police officer's possible injury;
304. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-69).
305. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444. Blackstone noted that "[tIhis power of
correction was confined within reasonable bounds." Id. "The civil law," in addition, "gave the
husband the same, or a larger authority over his wife: allowing him, for some misdemeanors,
flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem [to beat his wife severely with scourges and sticks];
for others, only modicam castigationem adhibere [to use moderate chastisement.]" Id. at 444-45
(translations by J.W. Ehrlich, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 85 (1959)).
306. Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia L. Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited 3
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 139 (1977). See also Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871)
("The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face, or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities is not now
acknowledged by our law.").
307. Elizabeth Pleck, Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America, 4 VICTiMOLOGY 60, 71
(1979). Blackstone also observed how "this power of correction began to be doubted" during
"the politer reign of Charles the second." BLACKSTONE, supra note 304, at *445. Nevertheless,
"the lower rank of people ... still claim and exert their ancient privilege: and the courts of law
will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour." Id.
308. The Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts indicated that some police still did
not believe that domestic violence was a serious crime, and they continued to enforce the law
selectively. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 270, at 137.
The linguistic transformation, modifying a "domestic assault" into the more euphemistic "do-
mestic disturbance," reinforces the traditional legal response that these crimes are relatively un-
important and that intervention is for the most part ineffective. RHODE, supra note 138, at 239.
The euphemistic manipulation also applies to the formal process in which police departments
categorize these types of assaults. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 21 (1990) (listing ambiguous classifications: "persons investigated," "services rendered").
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(10) police socialization perceiving domestic assaults as social work
and not as crime fighting; (11) police organizational disincentives and
inadequate training; and (12) high administrative costs in pursuing an
interventionist policy.30 9 Horka's rationale for not intervening, the
exorbitant cost of repairing a door,310 is a subset of the last
justification.
The supreme court concluded that Horka's refusal to act, based on
his conjecture that "this was a domestic situation," was "not at all re-
lated to any governmental purpose."'31' In so holding, the plaintiffs'
allegation satisfied both parts of the Feeney/Watson gender discrimina-
tion analysis.312 According to Feeney and Watson, because the defend-
ants had not articulated a legitimate reason for the disparate
treatment, the plaintiffs in Doe, like the plaintiffs in Watson, Dudosh
v. City of Allentown,313 and Balistreri, had successfully alleged that the
municipality discriminated against domestic violence victims. 314 And
because the defendants had not articulated an important governmen-
tal interest, Jane, like the plaintiffs in Thurman, had successfully al-
leged that the city discriminated against women. Doe is therefore one
of the rare cases where a court held that any interest or justification
advanced by the municipality would not withstand either minimal or
intermediate judicial scrutiny.
But the court's ruling is indebted to the analyses of sex stereotypes
in Price Waterhouse and Balistreri as much as it is to the analyses of
Equal Protection standards of review in Feeney or Watson. Classifica-
tions that treat domestic assaults differently and less seriously than
other assaults reinforce archaic stereotypes of female inferiority and
309. For rationalizations of legal inaction and critiques of the rationalizations, see BUZAWA &
BUZAWA, supra note 308, at 29-35; RHODE, supra note 138, at 239; Stephen E. Brown, Police
Responses to Wife Beating: Neglect of a Crime of Violence, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 277, 280 (1984);
Finesmith, supra note 302, at 85-86; Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 19-20 (1978); Hathaway, supra note 112, at 687-90; Holden, supra note
104, at 721, 725-27; Jeffrey A. Shapiro, Note, The Inadequate Police Protection of Battered Wives:
Can a City and Its Police Be Held Liable Under the Equal Protection Clause?, 14 FoRDHAM URB.
L.J. 417, 434-38 (1985-1986).
310. Appellants' Brief at 9.
311. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 510 (I11. 994) (emphasis added). See also Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984) ("[T]he City has failed to put
forward any justification for its disparate treatment of women.").
312. See supra notes 127-49 and accompanying text (discussing gender discrimination analysis
outlined by Watson and Feeney).
313. 665 F. Supp. 381, 394 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F.
Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942
(1988), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part sub nom. Dudosh v. City of Allentown,
722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
314. In actuality, Jane declined to allege this type of discrimination. Appellants' Brief app. at
III.A.
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old notions of wives as the property of their husbands.315 It is not
difficult to identify and criticize the stereotypical views and unproven
assumptions that undergird each of the police justifications enumer-
ated above.316 For example, the excuse that the police defer to family
privacy rests upon the assumption of the home as safe haven and
therefore free from intrusion.317 For the battered wife, however, the
home is unsafe, and the state should intervene so as to reestablish the
function of the home as sanctuary.318 The excuse that wife abuse is a
minor crime is belied by the statistics of the Task Force Report that
show 253,000 women were victims of domestic violence in Illinois and
five million nationwide. 319 The belief that intervention is dangerous
and that police officers might be injured can be logically but improp-
erly extended to bar officers from any duties in which an officer is at
risk.320
An examination of the treatment of archaic and stereotypic notions
in Price Waterhouse, Balistreri, and Doe reveals not only Doe's simi-
larities to those cases but also its differences. It is especially the differ-
ences that make Doe an important decision. In Price Waterhouse,
many of the partners' remarks that evaluated the performance of Ann
Hopkins were expressed in terms of gender: she was a macho woman
who, to improve her chances for partnership, should walk, talk, and
dress like a lady.321 The stereotyping at Price Waterhouse was tangi-
ble, obvious, and unambiguous. "This [was] not," said the Court,
" 'discrimination in the air' ... [but] rather... 'discrimination brought
to ground and visited upon' an employee. ' 322 In Balistreri, the evi-
dence of stereotyping was less ample but just as damaging to the de-
fendants. After Jena Balistreri was severely beaten by her husband,
one responding officer stated that the husband was not to blame "be-
cause of the way she was 'carrying on.' "323 As with the partners'
comments in Price Waterhouse, the officer's words were stereotypical
on their face, signifying an "animus against abused women." 324
315. Hathaway, supra note 112, at 684.
316. See supra text accompanying note 309 (listing the various justifications police depart-
ments have advanced for official inaction in spousal abuse cases).
317. Lisa Lerman, A Model State Act. Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
61, 69-70 (1984).
318. Id. at 70.
319. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 270, at 130. See supra note 138 and accompanying text
(demonstrating statistically the widespread scope of domestic violence).
320. Shapiro, supra note 309, at 436.
321. 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
322. Id. at 251.
323. 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988).
324. Id.
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In Doe, by contrast, the evidence of stereotyping was less direct.
There, the court based its conclusion on Horka's rude and demeaning
questions, his statements that Jane was hysterical, and his belief that
she was a domestic assault victim and therefore deserving of less at-
tention.325 In Doe, as opposed to Price Waterhouse and Balistreri, the
defendants' reliance on stereotyping was less tangible and not as obvi-
ous. 326 Horka, for example, never spoke about a domestic assault.
His questions imply that he had been called to one, but it is the court
that traced by inference the sequence from Horka's questions to the
imagined domestic assault which then provided the (illegitimate) ra-
tionale for the officer's inaction. Identifying stereotypical assump-
tions in Doe involved an inferential analysis, deriving logical
conclusions from the defendants' assumed premises, a method of rea-
soning that was unnecessary in Price Waterhouse and Balistreri.
Doe is an influential decision because of the unique mode of analy-
sis employed by the Illinois Supreme Court. In its willingness to go
beyond the literal significance of a state actor's remarks and consider
his underlying stereotypical views, the Doe court extended the Equal
Protection principles in Thurman, Watson, Lowers, and Balistreri.
IV. IMPACT
As the introduction to this Note indicated, several municipalities
and commentators discounted the impact of Doe because it was based
on such egregious circumstances. 32 7 Since Horka's conduct was so ex-
treme and the underlying facts so bizarre, the decision would not
change routine police work.32 8 As one police chief observed matter of
factly, "If we engage in willful and wanton conduct, we should be held
liable, as should anybody else. ' 32 9 However, a Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim does not have to be predicated on willful and wanton con-
duct but rather may be based on "the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women. ' 330 Horka's assumption about the appropriate offi-
325. 641 N.E.2d 498, 509-10 (Ill. 1994).
326. The complaint alleged that other Calumet City police officers made what were obviously
sexist remarks: "What would you expect from a woman?" and "Isn't it just like a woman?" to be
in this situation. Appellants' Brief at 13. If included in the majority opinion, these remarks
would have made Doe much more analogous to Balistreri. It is noteworthy that the majority did
not find the words necessary to establish an Equal Protection violation.
327. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the reactions of police depart-
ments, municipalities, and commentators to Doe).
328. Griffin & Irwin, supra note 51, at 7.
329. Id.
330. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
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cial response to domestic violence is not on its face egregious precisely
because it is so traditional. Doe undercuts the complacent response
that reduces the decision's impact as the unauthorized conduct of a
rogue officer. After Doe, state actors are liable not only for their will-
ful and wanton actions but also for their inaction based on a seemingly
innocuous assumption about the proper role of women.
In McKee, Judge Goldberg observed that in an Equal Protection
case, "[s]moking guns.., are not required" to prove gender discrimi-
nation.331 But Judge Goldberg was the lone dissenter in McKee.3 32
Price Waterhouse and Balistreri are easier cases than Doe precisely
because of the presence of smoking guns. Doe, on the other hand, is a
closer case, and because it is, its impact for women plaintiffs is
profound. Doe stands for the proposition that discriminatory intent
may be discerned by reading between the lines of a defendant's re-
marks, by uncovering inferentially the embedded stereotype. Because
Doe illustrates Judge Goldberg's thesis, it lessens the evidentiary bur-
den for battered women in Equal Protection claims.
CONCLUSION
Thurman was decided in 1984, Doe in 1994. Although Thurman
promised to be a harbinger of Fourteenth Amendment protection for
battered women, it proved to be a false one. In the intervening ten
years, the Supreme Court decided DeShaney, effectively closing the
door on Due Process claims for domestic violence victims. 333 In 1988,
the Watson court's adoption of the two-part Feeney test presaged the
application of stricter gender-neutral standards. 334 In 1994, however,
the Doe court extended the gender discrimination analyses in Price
Waterhouse and Balistreri, and breathed new life into the Equal Pro-
tection clause. With Doe, the unfulfilled promise of Thurman was at
last satisfied, and battered women could again rely upon the Four-
teenth Amendment for protection and relief.
Daniel P. Whitmore
331. 877 F.2d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1989).
332. Id. at 416.
333. See supra note 104 (discussing the negative impact of DeShaney on battered women's
Due Process suits).
334. Harper, supra note 104, at 1404.
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